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Introduction
Six of the countries in Southern Africa - Tanzania,
Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swazi-
land - have been independent for well over a
decade. Over that period their governments have to
varying degrees initiated profound social and
economic change. Economic structures are now
more diversified, and the real value of production
has been greatly increased. More of the incomes
flowing from this production are retained nation-
ally, ie flow increasingly to citizen rather than to
metropolitan interests. Progress has been made
toward 'citizenising' the labour force. Major
increases in social services provision, particularly
of education and health, have been made. Many
more adjustments will take place, but in each of
these states the economy and polity is set on a
course which promotes change within an estab-
lished framework.
The other countries within the region are rather
different. For Mozambique and Angola, inde-
pendence from Portugal has been won very
recently. The wars in each of these countries
disrupted industrial and agricultural production,
causing major resource problems and, in particular,
bringing scarcities of food, foreign exchange and
investible resources. Acute shortages of skilled
workers have been exacerbated by the departure of
most of the Portuguese settlers. Decisions have
been taken by these governments to bring about
needed changes in patterns of ownership, produc-
tion and distribution. But the structural changes
which these entail are still very much under way,
with solutions to some of the key strategy questions
facing each nation still being sought.
In the remaining two countries considered in this
paper - Zimbabwe and Namibia - such changes are
yet to begin. Zimbabwe's independence came only
a few months ago. In Namibia it has yet to be won.
The illegal minority governments of these countries
have ruled in the context of discriminatory
economic, social and political structures which
have systematically and pervasively benefited
mainly a tiny white minority. The transition to
legitimate majority rule is likely to be followed by
shifts in production and employment relations
which may be no less profound than those currently
underway in Mozambique and Angola. In some
ways, however, the problems here may be even
more extreme. The likely exodus of whites will
create exceptionally severe shortages of local skills,
and the problems of maintaining output whilst
tackling the pressing need for social and economic
reconstruction will be extremely severe.
The fact that these 10 countries are at such different
stages in the transitional process implies that within
the region a very wide range of employment
problems - different in scale and, often, in kind -
are to be found. But in spite of this diversity, there
are common problems. This paper selects two:
migrant labour and skill shortages, particularly in
the formal sector. It is argued that these problems
may best be tackled by an approach which, inter
alia, aims to reduce the heavy dependence of
individual countries on South Africa, and to exploit
the complementary strengths and opportunities
provided by other countries within the region.
Migration for Work Abroad
The 10 Southern African countries, excluding
South Africa (RSA) have a combined population of
over 55 million, and a combined national product
of over US $8 billion per annum - approximately
$150 per capita. About one-eighth of the labour
force is in receipt of regular wages or salaries from
formal employment. The 3.5 million formal jobs in
the region include 250,000 currently held by
Europeans, and a further 500,000 held by migrant
Africans working in RSA or Zimbabwe. One in six
of all formally employed Africans in the region as a
whole (excluding RSA) are migrant workers. Table
I provides estimates of the scale of this migration
for each country. Those most severely affected by
the migrant labour system are Lesotho and
Botswana, where one-third and one-fifth of the
labour force, respectively, are working abroad at
any time - mainly in RSA, but to some extent in
Zimbabwe. Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi and
Zambia are also significant net suppliers of labour
to one or both of these countries.
The pattern of labour recruitment by the South
African mining sector has changed substantially
during the past few years. Three factors have been
mainly responsible. First, following an air crash in
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Francistown in April 1974, in which 74 Malawian
miners were killed, President Banda suspended all
further recruitment of Malawians for the mines.
Second, in 1976, recruitment of workers from
Mozambique was dramatically reduced following
the expiry of the earlier recruitment agreement
between the Portuguese and the South African
Government. Third, mine wages began to increase
rapidly from 1973 onwards, in part fuelled by
labour shortages generated by the two factors
mentioned above. This allowed a largely com-
pensatory increase in recruitment of labour from
within South Africa, and from Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland (BLS). In addition an agreement to
recruit up to 20,000 labourers per year was
negotiated with the Southern Rhodesian regime in
December 1974. The net result of all these changes
is that mine labour from RSA itself has increased
from one-fifth to over one-half of the mine labour
force. Recruits from Mozambique and Malawi
have been cut from one-half to little over 10 per
cent of the labour force. Finally, there was until
1977 some increase in recruitment from BLS, with
Zimbabwe as a new source of labour.
Historically, the presence of a large, non-citizen
African, migrant labour force has acted in the
interests of white South Africans. It has depressed
wages and increased unemployment of blacks
outside the mining sector, and has created even less
favourable circumstances in which to make
effective demands for improved wages and working
conditions in the mines themselves. Wilson [1972]
has shown that real wages for blacks in the mining
sector were probably lower in the mid 1960s than at
the beginning of the century. Ruthless exploitation
of the advantages presented by a regional labour
force has allowed the South African state and
employers to profit greatly over the last 80 years.
Nevertheless, the policy of increasing the propor-
tion of South African blacks employed in the mines
has come about not only as a short-term response
to recent political developments in the supplier
states. It is also part of a deliberate strategy to
reduce dependence upon foreign workers. The
present supplier states are seen by the South
African Government as increasingly unpredictable
sources of labour - particularly as the armed
struggle for liberation moves steadily south, to
focus finally and within the not too distant future
upon RSA itself. Increasing dependence upon
labour from the 'homelands' is seen as a safer
policy, and one which will bring few additional
costs to the mines. As the transition to so-called
'independence' for these regions is made, the South
African Government will no doubt use the same
arguments to absolve itself from all responsibility
for the support of the dependents of workers from
the 'homelands' as are used for foreign workers
today.
To this end, recruitment of black South Africans
will probably continue to increase, as will
mechanisation, together with a policy of encoura-
ging a stable workforce by reducing the recruitment
of novices from supplier states. The mines appear
to have cut back labour recruitment from BLS by
about 20 per cent during 1978-79. This reduction
of dependence upon foreign labour is likely to
continue over the next few years. Sudden
termination is unlikely because it will take the
South African labour market some time to adjust,
and new technologies can be introduced only
slowly. The net result will probably be a lower level
of foreign recruitment from a range of different
supply sources, with the South African Govern-
ment attempting to continue to exploit the different
attitudes and policies of the sending states.
The future for migrant labour working for
non-Chamber of Mines employers is less clear.
Such recruitment is not centrally organised, and is
more responsive to local labour market conditions.
Estate farmers for example will probably continue
to recruit seasonal agricultural labour from
Botswana, as long as the Botswana authorities and
the South African regulations permit. On balance,
however, recruitment can be expected to decline as
the South African Government increases pressure
on employers to hire local labour in the face of
rising levels of domestic unemployment. A
recession prompted by the introduction of
economic sanctions on South Africa would
accelerate these trends.
From the point of view of the supplier states, the
pros and cons of the migrant labour system are
fairly clear. The benefits are confined to income
effects - income for (mainly) the poorer house-
holds, foreign exchange to strengthen the balance of
payments, and additional government revenues
from fees charged to the recruiters and the
employers. Weighed against this are increased
dependence upon South Africa for the nations and
the individuals concerned, production (and politi-
cal and economic innovation) foregone through the
absence of males of working age, and the enormous
social costs of family separation together with the
personal humiliation associated with life under
apartheid in the prison-like conditions of the
mining compounds. Both from the perspectives of
the supplier states, which need to reduce
dependence upon South Africa, and of the South
African blacks, it is clear that a lengthy
continuation of the existing system would be
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undesirable. But the difficulties of terminating these
arrangements vary considerably amongst the
supplier countries.
The re-absorption of migrant labourers must be
tackled as part of the domestic employment
creation strategies of each of the countries
concerned. The most intractable case will be that of
Lesotho. As shown in Table 1, one-third of the
Basotho labour force works in South Africa - half
of them engaged by employers associated with the
Chamber of Mines. Employment of Basotho in the
Republic is over six times total formal employment
in Lesotho. Even in the long run, this proportion of
a growing labour force can be productively re-
absorbed in the domestic economy only at high
cost. Tourism can certainly be further developed,
but this is not very labour-intensive. Manufacturing
industries would probably need extensive and
extended subsidy, and the prospects for absorption
of large number of workers in agriculture are not
good in view of Lesotho's poor soils. At present,
over 40 per cent of national income comes from the
earnings of migrant labourers in South Africa.
Termination of this system, without compensatory
financial transfers from other sources, would
pauperise the great majority of Basotho house-
holds.
The problems of re-absorption are more manage-
able in the case of Botswana, although here too the
extent of dependence upon migrant labour is such
that its sudden termination would bring high costs:
allowing for 'illegal' migration, one-fifth of the
citizen labour force works abroad, remittances
comprise one-fifth of household income for the
poorest tenth of the rural population [Colclough
and Fallon 1979], and employment in RSA is 10
per cent greater than formal employment in
Botswana. On the other hand, migration is not
generally a long-term survival strategy, as it is for
many Basotho, and the obstacles to rapidly
increasing domestic labour use are much less
formidable. Batswana tend to use the migrant
labour system as a means of building up enough
capital to buy cattle and to start farming. A range of
solutions could be tried, but research has shown
that the most important priorities are to provide the
poorer families with reliable and timely access to
draught-power, and to increase substantially the
resources for both production and research in
arable agriculture [Colclough and McCarthy 1980;
Lipton 1978].
In the other supplier states, the problems of
terminating migrant labour flows to South Africa
are less serious. Swaziland, with about eight per
cent of its labour force employed in South Africa,
32
and with a much higher proportion of its domestic
workers engaged in formal sector jobs (25 per cent
compared to 17 per cent in Botswana, or about
three times as many as work in RSA), is less
critically dependent upon work in South Africa
than either Botswana or Lesotho. Mozambique and
Malawi have already coped with substantial sever-
ance from the migrant labour system. In both
countries this must have caused severe difficulties
for thousands of families over the last few years -
although no information is available on how and
with what success the migrants concerned have
been re-absorbed in the domestic rural sector.
In fact, Mozambique and Malawi now have many
more workers in Zimbabwe than in South Africa.
About 200,000 people - mainly from these
countries, but also including significant numbers of
Zambians and a few thousand Batswana - now hold
jobs in Zimbabwe (Table 1). Many of these have
become semi-permanent residents and have severed
links with their homes to a much greater extent
than is permitted in RSA, Here too, however, such
work opportunities may not be available in-
definitely. The legitimately independent govern-
ment in Zimbabwe is now faced with urgent
problems of reconstruction and structural change,
of rising unemployment, of absorbing tens of
thousands of returning refugees, and probably also
the 50,000 or so Zimbabweans currently working in
South Africa. It will inevitably have to give low
priority to the protection of jobs held by
non-citizen Africans. Mozambique, Malawi and
Zambia must therefore face the repatriation of most
of their citizens working in Zimbabwe.
Nevertheless, except in Lesotho, and to a lesser
extent in Botswana, the problem of re-absorption of
migrants is manageable (albeit difficult and costly)
for the majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa
- particularly when compared with the much bigger
problem of under-utilisation of domestic labour,
and with the rapid annual growth of the domestic
labour force. The rural sector in each country will
have to absorb most of these additional workers. To
this end, long-term national policies for agri-
cultural and rural development must be devised
which aim to provide productive work opportu-
nities for the people who are displaced from
abroad, and for those who are without adequate
work at home. Meanwhile the supplier states will
wish to maximise the domestic benefits from the
migrant labour system as long as it continues to
operate, and to prepare contingency arrangements
which would reduce the costs of a sudden reduction
or termination of the present opportunities facing
migrant workers. Desirable action at the regional
and international levels is discussed in the final
section of this article.
Problems in the Skilled Labour Market
Historical background
Throughout the region, modern production struc-
tures were established during the colonial period
without the creation of the required skills among
the indigenous population. Most of these states
were settler colonies; the colonialists came to stay,
profiting enormously from the territories' re-
sources. Education was typically provided by the
missionary societies. Metropolitan governments
were parsimonious, and expenditure on education
in the colonies won few votes. The missionaries,
however, needed to educate the heathen in order to
convert him, and also needed local rather than
metropolitan support. This provided a convenient
division of interests, and colonial governments
were content to leave the provision of education
(and health) services largely to other agencies.
In most countries of Southern Africa, however,
education and training were neglected not only
because of the expense involved but also as a means
of preventing Africans and Europeans from
competing on equal terms in the labour market. In
Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, the colonists
reinforced these policies with job reservation and
other mechanisms in order to divide whites and
blacks into non-competing groups. Outside RSA
itself, such labour policies took their most extreme
form in these two territories, but their elements
were present in varying degrees throughout the
region prior to independence.
As a result, post-primary education and training
prior to independence covered only a tiny
proportion of the population. Although mission
secondary schools often provided education of a
high standard, this rarely went beyond a basic
three-year post-primary cycle. The number of
Africans who had managed to gain higher
education was derisorily small: in Zambia there
were fewer than 100 African graduates in 1964; in
BLS the numbers were even lower.
Technical education was virtually non-existent. It
is true that the gaps in the technical fields often
relate back to an inadequate mathematics ground-
ing at primary level: even today numeracy
throughout the region remains more elusive than
literacy. But even where students did have both an
aptitude and an adequate basis for technical
studies, the opportunities for pursuing these within
their own countries were almost non-existent,
particularly in comparison with the needs. In
Southern Rhodesia and Zambia (though not in
Namibia), where the mining and manufacturing
sectors were developed early, some training in
technical skills became established. But this was
limited to comparatively low levels, leading to
occupations where settler interests were not
threatened. In jobs where there was a strong white
involvement, the response to labour shortages was
usually to import more labour from abroad, rather
than to provide the training infrastructure needed
to secure African advancement.
Thus in the six countries which achieved
independence during the 1 960s, European workers
occupied 10-15 per cent of all jobs in the formal
sector at independence. At the higher levels of the
occupational structure there were hardly any
Africans, and the few citizens who had succeeded in
attaining advanced qualifications were usually
working in the schools and primary teacher training
colleges, rather than in government or the directly
productive sectors. The manpower problems facing
the newly-independent states were thus awesome -
similar in quantitative terms (though not in speed
of transition required) to those facing Mozambique
and Angola today and to those which will face
Namibia and Zimbabwe in the near future.
The policy response and the emergence of new
problems
The main policy response to the acute manpower
shortages facing Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and
BLS has been a massive increase in the provision of
formal schooling. Over the first decade of
independence, secondary school enrolments dou-
bled in Tanzania and tripled in Swaziland; in
Zambia they increased five-fold and in Botswana
more than six-fold. Universities were established in
all these states, and here too enrolments have
increased very rapidly. Educational policy has thus
been dominated by the concern to expand the
fledgling systems inherited from colonial days.
Important attempts have been made to secure
qualitative improvements at primary level by the
provision of better equipment and trained teachers
and by the reduction of rates of attrition and of class
size. In Tanzania the reforms have gone much
further. Inevitably, however, in all countries the
major emphasis in terms of the allocation of both
financial and administrative resources has been
placed upon the post-primary system.
In part as a result of this emphasis, progress has
been made in localising the labour force in all these
countries: in every case, non-citizen workers now
comprise less than one-tenth of formal employ-
ment (Table 1), and the influence wielded by
foreign workers has been much reduced. They are
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now concentrated in technical and supportive
professional jobs, and no longer occupy the highest
decision-making posts in government. The high
initial expectations of national policy makers have,
however, been disappointed. Although the pro-
portional importance of expatriates has fallen, in
absolute terms there are now twice as many
non-citizen workers in Botswana as in 1966; there
are more, also, in Swaziland and Lesotho; Zambia
- with 33,000 expatriate employees - now has
about the same number as were employed at
independence. Only in Tanzania has really
dramatic progress with localisation been achieved
with scarcely more than one per cent of all formal
jobs now being held by non-citizens.
These differences are primarily a reflection of
differences in economic structure. Very rapid
modern sector growth in Botswana, and to a lesser
extent in Swaziland, has outstripped the capacity of
even a greatly expanded formal education system.
In Zambia, on the other hand, the dominance and
technical complexity of copper mining largely
accounts for the continued presence of so many
non-citizen workers: this sector accounts for over
one-third of all non-citizens employed in Zambia,
and the number of expatriate mining personnel has
actually increased by about 50 per cent since
independence.
But the different relative emphases which have
been given to the expansion of schools, universities
and other forms of post-secondary education and
training have not always promoted localisation.
Each of these countries has had at least one
manpower plan since independence, but in most
cases these have strongly emphasised the role of the
schools in forming required skills, and perhaps
underplayed the crucial importance of various
forms of formal and non-formal training. Three of
these plans (Zambia 1966, Botswana 1973 and
Swaziland 1978) attempted to quantify the need for
training, based upon survey evidence, but only in
the last was caution expressed about the desirability
of further secondary school expansion, and
importance given to means of promoting employ-
ment-linked training schemes for the formal sector.
As a result, post-primary school leaver unemploy-
ment will soon become a general problem. In some
countries this has already happened: unemploy-
ment of 'O' level school leavers emerged in Zambia
in the early 1970s, and in Swaziland it began to
appear in 1978. This relatively new phenomenon
in Southern Africa, of rising levels of educated
unemployment co-existing with a continued
dependence upon the skills of non-citizens, is likely
to become more widespread over the next few
years.
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Governments are attempting to tackle this problem
in various ways. First, there is an increased concern
to ensure that educational expenditure concentrates
on providing a sound basic education for all
(including, especially in the case of Tanzania,
greater emphasis on adult education for those who
never had access to primary school), rather than
allowing an increasing proportion of resources tobe
pre-empted by providing an expensive higher
education for a small minority.
Secondly, there are moves towards making the
basic cycle of schooling more suitable for the needs
of most children. These include attempts to
'localise' curricula, the introduction of mother
tongues as media of instruction, introducing
productive work and pre-vocational training into
the syllabus, challenging the examination-oriented
rote learning approaches of existing systems, and
introducing alternative means of assessment and
selection - both for promotion within education
and from education to jobs. Tanzaniark policies of
'education for self reliance' have incorporated such
reforms during the last ten years. A recent
comprehensive review of the Zambian education
system included these and other measures amongst
its proposals. The policies of Botswana and
Swaziland are also moving in these directions.
Third, increased emphasis is being placed upon
other institutional mechanisms in order to promote
localisation. Whilst selective expansion of univer-
sity departments, particularly in science-based
disciplines, is still needed throughout the region,
many of the most critical skills can best be acquired
outside the formal educational structure. The
prime requisite is to ensure more structured job
experience for new educated recruits, and more
clearly organised learning-on-the-job, supported by
release or 'sandwich' arrangements for the
acquisition of technical skills. Such training is the
main way in which localisation of the formal sector
labour force can be speeded up. Training levies and
other incentive schemes need to be introduced by
more states as a means of increasing the amount of
training undertaken by private employers. Training
must be seen as the prime responsibility of those
expatriates now working in technical jobs.
Although some further expansion of university and
technical training facilities is desirable, in general
the institutional facilities to provide the required
skills already exist. The major problem is in
making them function effectively, and in ensuring
that training, employment and incentive structures
reflect changing priorities on a year-to-year basis.
Mozambique and Angola are at a much earlier
stage in dealing with these problems. Their
education policies are closer to those of Tanzania:
emphasis is put upon basic literacy, and therefore
upon primary and adult education; education is
strongly integrated with work - both during and
after completion of each stage of schooling; strong
emphasis is placed upon worker education, and the
government organises many small training courses
for worker upgrading. Quantitatively, these coun-
tries face localisation problems greater than those
of Zambia. Precise magnitudes cannot yet be
assessed, and the establishment of such data will
presumably be an early priority.
Namibia and Zimbabwe will also have special
problems. These countries have relatively well
developed production structures, making them -
relative to the distribution of populations - the
richest nations in the Southern African region
outside RSA. However, as the papers by Green and
Riddell show, owing to the racialist policies which
have been pursued in education and training, the
maintenance of these production levels is at present
highly dependent upon the skills held by white
settlers and expatriates.
The transition to legitimate majority rule in each of
these countries will bring1 radical changes in
production relations, particularly in agriculture,
mining and manufacturing, with land reforms and
increased state participation in production; radical
shifts in the nature and pattern of provision of
services, particularly in health and education;
probable sharp changes in the distribution of net
earnings from work, with large average reductions
at the top. One consequence of these changes will
be a major exodus of whites - particularly those in
more skilled or senior positions.
In many ways this is highly desirable. In Namibia, a
large proportion of the whites have South African
nationality, and their continuation - particularly in
government service - would be inappropriate.
Ingrained colonial attitudes will not be helpful
under new arrangements. As a result, however,
major gaps will be created amongst the most skilled
and experienced sections of the labour force.
In aggregate terms, this could mean the loss of
between Il and 15 per cent of the formally
employed labour force in both countries. But
between 70 and 80 per cent of the skilled labour
force is likely to be lost - more than 25,000 skilled
persons from Namibia, and as many as 50-100,000
in the case of Zimbabwe. Most of these skills will
1 Although Mr Mugabe is currently adopting a cautious approach
to policy reforms, the expectations of his black electorate are
such that changes cannot be postponed indefinitely.
have to be replaced. Structural changes in
production, ownership and distribution will
undoubtedly chan e the skill mix - particularly in
agriculture, education, health and government. But
in spite of these changes in composition, the
aggregate need for educated and trained persons is
unlikely to be much reduced. In Namibia, at least,
it is likely tD increase. Thus, in both these countries
there will be major problems of qualitative,
quantitative and structural readjustment in the
manpower field.
First, there will be a need to identify those Africans
- and there are tens of thousands - who have
acquired skills by informal means outside the
school-university system, and who are suitable for
rapid upgrading to skilled jobs in the formal sector.
This will involve designing specific short-term
upgrading courses in a wide range of clerical,
artisan and technical fields. A flexible system of
adult education, training and testing centres is
needed, in order to identify existing and potential
skills, to organise the basic training required, and to
link into other, more structured training institu-
tions which provide longer-term instruction for the
acquisition of priority skills. Second, a domestic
training and education infrastructure will be
required for medium-/long-term economic and
structural change. Decisions will need to be based
upon a careful analysis of the transitional and
projected employment structure - in turn based
upon economic and political priorities, and
detailed staffing analogues from other independent
African states. Third, a framework needs to be
established for regional cooperation in training in
skills which are of high priority but are expensive to
acquire. Fourth, technical cooperation with other
countries, in terms of the temporary provision of
skilled workers, will be needed during the
transitional and immediate post independence
phase. The dimensions, sources and nature of this
programme need careful thought, as does a
framework to facilitate a rapid reduction of
dependence upon such outside sources of skills.
The initiatives which appear to be required at the
regional and international levels are indicated
below.
Regional and International Initiatives
Migrant labour
South Africa remains dependent upon migrant
labour from surrounding states - but this
dependence is gradually being reduced. For various
strategic and economic reasons, however, migra-
tion is likely to continue - albeit at a lower level.
Early termination of labour flows is likely only in
the event of a deterioration of South Africa's
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economic position (eg as a result of international
sanctions or if the armed struggle moves into South
Africa itself). In this situation, a range of actions at
the regional and international levels are desirable.
Regional initiatives. The supplier states have an
interest in coordinating their policies on migrant
labour. To this end, meetings were held during
1978 in Lusaka to discuss matters of common con-
cern. Negotiations with the mines for improving
working and living conditions will be more effective
if all supplier states speak with a common voice.
There is also much to be gained from reviewing
alternative national policies for the re-absorption of
returning migrants in the event of rapid change in
the political or economic circumstances of the
Republic.
An area of common interest is the fees collected
from labour recruiters. Apart from the small
charges made for recruitment licences, 'attestation'
fees are currently levied by the supplier states on a
per capita basis. These vary between R5 per
labourer recruited in Swaziland and R15 in Leso-
tho. The evidence suggests that if all supplier states
were to adopt the same level of attestation fees for
mine work, the level of charges could be raised very
substantially without significantly reducing the
flow of recruits in the short-term.
Fees of even Rl00 per recruit would increase
African labour costs in the mines by less than ten
per cent - far less than the tax revenue raised by the
South African Government on the profits and other
incomes generated by migrant workers.
International cooperation. Other initiatives re-
quire both regional and international cooperation.
Swaziland and Botswana, but especially Lesotho,
would require substantial additional aid in the
event of a sudden contraction of employment
opportunities in South Africa, in order to avoid
huge income losses to the poorer families. The scale
of transfers would be at least of the order of $5 mn,
$20 mn and $100 mn per year respectively, if full
compensation were to be provided. In Swaziland
and Botswana, domestic employment policies can
be designed for absorbing repatriated migrant
labourers within the medium-term. The case of
Lesotho is different; large amounts of aid will be
needed over the long-term if that country's present
dependence upon employment in South Africa is
removed.
An urgent study of employment possibilities in
Lesotho is required. This should focus upon identi-
fying public projects which are capable both of
absorbing large amounts of unskilled labour, and of
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providing the capital to sustain and employ a
growing labour force. The costs of such a pro-
gramme will be large. But short-term investments
of this magnitude will be less costly and more
beneficial over the long run than continuing
indefinitely the scale of recurrent support which
would otherwise be required.
Indeed, especially in the case of Lesotho, inter-
national support is needed now for poor peasant-
oriented rural development and formal employ-
ment creation related to skills acquired in South
Africa. Migrant levels have begun to fall; the
re-absorption problem is already confronting many
households. To delay building up international
support until a crisis emerges will guarantee that
the support will be too little, too late, too irrelevant.
Training and technical cooperation
The most urgent skilled manpower problems to be
faced in Southern Africa over the next few years
will be those generated by the transition to
legitimate majority rule in Namibia and Zim-
babwe. These countries account for over half of the
whites employed in the region outside RSA - the
majority of whom may have to be replaced. This is
not to underestimate the profound manpower
problems at present faced by Mozambique and
Angola: almost one million Portuguese residents
(including workers and dependents) have left since
1975, and have been supplemented by much
smaller numbers of cooperantes, mainly from
Cuba, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Sub-
stantial skill shortages remain. However, large
numbers of the Portuguese workers were unskilled
or semi-skilled; this is not, in general, true of the
whites working in Namibia and Zimbabwe. More-
over, because industrial structures in these
countries are more developed - relative to the skill
level of their African populations - transitional
problems will be more acute than those which have
been faced by other countries in the region.
Whites in Namibia and Zimbabwe dominate the
professional and technical occupations [UNIN
1978; Colclough and Murray 1979]. The most
acute shortages, in the event of a European exodus,
are likely to occur in the engineering, geological,
medical, veterinary, dentistry, accounting, legal
and architectural professions. There will also be a
general shortage of workers in science based
occupations - including science teachers - and of
technicians, artisan foremen, and skilled craftsmen
at all levels of production. Few Africans have
acquired such skills domestically through formal
training. Although between six and eight thousand
Zimbabweans have received scholarships for
Lesotho women winnowing sorghum.
training abroad since 1966, the numbers trained in
the above fields are still far less than will be
required. Namibia is in a much worse position,
with no more than about 300 graduates from post-
secondary courses abroad.
Although the magnitude of the training require-
ments is greater in Namibia and Zimbabwe than
elsewhere, the skill priorities themselves are not
significantly different. In all occupations which
require specialised training at post-secondary
levels, shortages are widespread. Each country has
developed - or will shortly do so - an infrastructure
sufficient to meet its needs for workers with general
educational qualifications - including the basic
university disciplines which lead to jobs in
government administration, management and
teaching. Nevertheless, regional cooperation in the
development of more specialised education and
training courses along the following lines is highly
desirable:
- in some occupations and countries, the im-
mediate requirements for citizenisation are very
large, relative to long-term needs for growth and
replacement. This is true for civil, electrical and
mechanical engineers, geologists, other mining
skills and related technicians, in Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Namibia and, to an extent, Bots-
wana. An appropriate strategy might be to
expand the school of mines at UNZA, and the
faculty of engineering at the University of
Zimbabwe, to admit both more nationals and
students from these other states. During the first
few years significant numbers of Batswana and
Namibians would study elsewhere in Africa, or
in the UK. Over the medium-term, however,
more of the increased capacity in Lusaka and
Salisbury could be taken up by other non-
nationals, as the immediate localisation pro-
blem diminishes in these two countries;
- national faculties of medicine, dentistry, forestry
and veterinary science are too expensive to justify
in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia.
Economies of scale in these disciplines are very
high. Their provision could be tackled on a
multi-national basis, taking account of the needs
of all the states in the region;
- the need for other graduate specialisms will in
some cases be small. Degree courses are desirable
in architecture, surveying, town and regional
planning. Such courses could take more account
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of local needs and resources than those available
in western universities. But limited enrolments
will require that these be introduced on a
regional, rather than a national basis. In addition,
undergraduate courses in non-priority disciplines
- eg some European languages, religious studies,
psychology together with most postgraduate
degree courses need not be represented in more
than two or three of the national universities
during the early years;
with regard to sub-degree programmes, the
possibility of making firm long-term arrange-
ments amongst 'anglophone' countries in the
region could also be explored. Railway training is
an urgent priority for Zimbabwe, Namibia and
Botswana. In view of the strong possibility of
additional railway links between these three
countries, some cooperative approach to training
(and staffing) is desirable. Facilities are already
well developed at the railway training school in
Bulawayo. These could be expanded, or
alternatively a new centre could be built up as
part of a new maintenance/servicing centre
which will almost certainly be required in Bots-
wana and/or Namibia;
- as regards other skills, Swaziland would be an
appropriate centre for forestry training; Namibia
for fisheries; Botswana and Swaziland, in the
context of expansion of the Institute of
Development Management, for planning,
finance, taxation and customs administration.
Training for these latter skills, which are still
scarce throughout the region, could also be
developed at a number of centres, including the
Institute of Finance Management in Dar es
Salaam;
- the training of science, engineering, and medical
technicians is such a large and urgent priority
that most countries will wish to establish their
own facilities. BLS and Namibia may wish to
explore the possibility of using facilities in other
countries in the region on grounds of cost
effectiveness, but even in these- countries,
national programmes would in most cases be
viable. It would seem sensible to integrate this
'tertiary' level training in one national institu-
tion: the Malawian polytechnic concept appears
particularly relevant. The danger is that the unit
cost of training may be pulled up by association
with university departments, rather than vice
versa; but this need not necessarily be the case.
Regional cooperation in tertiary level training
does not involve the creation of new joint univer-
sities or colleges. Recent experience with UBLS
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demonstrates the inevitability of tension if national
funds are used to build up jointly owned facilities in
other countries. But unless students from one
country can be trained in another, many tertiary
level courses will not be viable. If regional training
initiatives are to succeed, capital costs must be met
from external sources, as part of a technical
cooperation programme financed by the inter-
national community. This would be separate from,
and in addition to, monies received by individual
countries through existing bi-lateral and multi-
lateral channels. For some countries, also,
provision of recurrent costs will be important
because of foreign exchange constraints. For a host
state to be willing, over the long or even medium-
term, to provide a substantial number of places for
citizens of other states, it must receive the full
recurrent costs either from the sending states or
through international cooperation. Such financial
guarantees would facilitate the negotiation of
medium-term cost-sharing agreements for particu-
lar tertiary level courses.
Temporary expatriate manpower
Namibia and Zimbabwe combined may need the
temporary assistance of up to 75,000 skilled
expatriates during the early post-independence
period (Green's figure of 15,000-17,500 for
Namibia, together with author's estimate of about
60 per cent of the present level of white employ-
ment in Zimbabwe). Holding post-independence
requirements down to these levels would represent
and require a significant step towards Africanising
the labour force, But, relative to the size of the
national populations, this still implies very large
technical cooperation programmes.
If one-third of these recruits were financed through
technical cooperation arrangements, the costs to
the international community would be around
£300 mn per year at current rates. Full use could be
made in recruitment of friendly governments and
agencies. If the destabilising presence of 'unsuit-
able' expatriates is to be avoided, it is important
that a high proportion of these foreign personnel
are interviewed and selected by Namibians and
Zimbabweans themselves. Strong recruitment
'vetting' offices could usefully be established by the
two governments. One aim is likely to be the
recruitment of technical cooperation personnel
from other friendly Third World countries with
specific skilled labour surpluses. Some countries in
the region have already initiated technical
cooperation agreements with Nigeria and with
India. Such programmes could usefully be initiated
in Zimbabwe and in Namibia after its transition to
majority rule.
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